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THE INEVITABILITY OF FEDERAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
GREGORY C. SISK*
I. INTRODUCTION
O UR nation was founded more than two hundred years ago through apopular revolution against a sovereign monarch. Having forsaken
reverence for the British Crown, "[u]nder our system the people, who are
there called subjects, are sovereign."' In the past half-century, avenues for
litigation have expanded, along with more frequent invocation of rights as
claims in court-constitutional, statutory, and common-law. For better or
worse, in the present day, individual sovereignty appears to be the cultural
byword, celebrating unconstrained personal autonomy. Thus, the pro-
position that the government may be excused from having to answer to
individuals in court may seem antithetical to most Americans.
And yet few doctrines are more solidly anchored in Supreme Court
precedent than that the United States government may not be sued with-
out its consent.2 Indeed, even when the federal government has granted
permission by statute, courts (too) often restore a large measure of ex-
emption from liability by declaring that a waiver of sovereign immunity
must be construed strictly and narrowly in favor of the government.3
Before the Supreme Court and in the Congress, the debate rages on
about whether the states should be regarded as retaining immunity from
suit even when litigation is authorized by federal legislation. But the pre-
mise that the federal government is not subject to suit without its consent
occasions little meaningful dissent in public life today. To be sure, the
source and legitimacy of sovereign immunity anywhere on this continent
continues to attract thoughtful examination by legal historians and aca-
demic theorists, including those participating in this symposium. But
those with the power to translate theory into law-the members of the
* Orestes A. Brownson Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of
Law (Minnesota) (gcsisk@stthomas.edu). For comments and reactions to these
ideas and the Texas City Disaster scenario, I thank the participants and audience
for the Norman J. Shachoy Symposium at Villanova University School of Law, the
federal judges of the District of Minnesota at their Rochester program, Arthur
Hellman, Gary Lawson, and law students at two presentations at the University of
St. Thomas School of Law.
1. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 208 (1882).
2. See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983) ("It is axiomatic that
the United States may not be sued without its consent and that the existence of
consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction."); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
264, 411-12 (1821) (holding principle that United States may not be sued without
its consent as "universally received opinion").
3. See, e.g., Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 318 (1986); Ruckelshaus
v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 685-86 (1983).
(899)
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federal judiciary and the Congress-regard federal sovereign immunity as
a given baseline. (However, the circumstances under which that immunity
should be surrendered and the manner in which waiver statutes should be
interpreted continue to be disputed and the law continues to evolve.) As
Laurence Tribe says, "[t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity is in no dan-
ger of falling out of official favor any time soon."4
Why is that so?
In this symposium Article, I submit that federal sovereign immunity
not only does not contradict popular sovereignty,5 but enhances demo-
cratic rule and fortifies the separation of powers between the political and
judicial branches.6 Properly understood, and given the longstanding ac-
ceptance of judicial restraint of ongoing government conduct that truly
contravenes constitutional directives, federal sovereign immunity fits com-
fortably with popular sovereignty, divided and diminished government
power, and political accountability for public officers.
As I have written previously, "sovereign immunity-or something like
it-may have been an inevitable legal development, because open-ended
and unconstrained access to the courts by those who object to governmen-
tal policies or actions could undermine effective governance by the people
through an electoral majority."7 Although this argument has a weaker
purchase when the government's actions are challenged as breaching our
nation's foundational charter, the Supreme Court long since has affirmed
a constitutional exception to federal sovereign immunity.8 And, in any
event, Congress acted decades ago to waive the sovereign immunity of the
United States by statute for challenges to government actions contrary to
the Constitution.9
Accordingly, for any continuing struggle about federal sovereign im-
munity, the battleground lies on the field of common-law and non-consti-
tutional legal claims. In particular, as I will illustrate with a leading and
historically-significant case,10 the doctrine of sovereign immunity prevents
the judiciary from abusing tort law concepts like negligence and strict lia-
bility to substitute its judgment for the policy choices made by the political
branches. When people do suffer significant harm as a result of policy
choices made within constitutional bounds by the government, the rem-
4. 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 3-25, at 520 (3d
ed. 2000).
5. See infra Part II.A.
6. See infra Part II.B.
7. Gregory C. Sisk, The Continuing Drift of Federal Sovereign Immunity Jurispru-
dence, 50 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 517, 529 (2008).
8. See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 696(1949).
9. See Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, 90 Stat. 2721 (1976) (waiving
sovereign immunity of United States) (codified at Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 702); see also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (B) (authorizing judicial review of agency
action "contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity").
10. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953); see also infra Part II.C.
900 [Vol. 55: p. 899
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edy lies in democratic governance." Sovereign immunity leaves ample
room for arguments based on social justice and morality and on demands
for political accountability in the public square.
At the same time, when the federal government has been made ame-
nable to litigation by the democratically-elected Congress, the courts
should not reconstruct a broader immunity through a jaundiced and hos-
tile interpretation of the statute.' 2 If a statutory waiver of federal sover-
eign immunity is construed too strictly and narrowly, so that every
statutory term is slanted against the claimant, the legislative promise of
meaningful judicial relief may be frustrated. Here too, I will illustrate my
point with a Supreme Court case addressing the liability in tort of the fed-
eral government,' 3 an encouraging decision of ordinary statutory con-
struction that bolsters the remedy that Congress intended.
II. A GENERAL DEFENSE OF FEDERAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
A. Integrating Popular Sovereignty and the Sovereign Immunity
of the United States Government
I acknowledge the considerable and venerable jurisprudence on the
sovereignty of God, State, and Individual, which variably but strictly de-
fines that sovereignty in terms of supreme authority, plenary indepen-
dence, or absolute will. My purpose and exegesis in this Article are more
pedestrian. In saying that the federal government is "sovereign," I mean
nothing more than to identify that entity which serves as the authoritative
political embodiment of the collective American people.
To be sure, scholars from political philosopher Jean Boudin in the
16th century to Catholic sage Jacques Maritain in the last century have
alternately pronounced or condemned the concept or at least the lexicon
of "sovereignty" as quintessentially absolutist in nature.1 4 As our host Pat-
rick Brennan has cogently argued, careless invocation of sovereignty, such
as by conferring the pretension of sovereign "dignity" to state govern-
ments,15 could foster an attitude of submission by citizens, submerging
individual rights and dignity to the overweening power of the state.' 6 But
11. See infra Part II.D.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481 (2006); see also infra Part III.
14. See Patrick McKinley Brennan, Sovereign States? The State of the Question from
a Catholic Perspective, in FAITH AND LAw: How RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS FROM CALVIN-
Ism To ISLAM VIEW AMERICAN LAw 176, 177-79 (Robert F. Cochran,Jr. ed., 2008); see
also Pavlos Eleftheriadis, Law and Sovereignty 4 (Oxford Legal Studies Research,
Working Paper No. 42/2009, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1486084
("Sovereignty, when taken seriously, is the affirmation of absolutism.").
15. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 714-15 (1999) ("The federal system es-
tablished by our Constitution preserves the sovereign status of the States [includ-
ing reserving] to them a substantial portion of the Nation's primary sovereignty,
together with the dignity and essential attributes inhering in that status.").
16. Patrick McKinley Brennan, Against Sovereignty: A Cautionary Note on the Nor-
mative Power of the Actual, 82 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 181, 192-93, 217-18 (2006).
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to the fears of sovereign despotism or "the road to serfdom,"' 7 a partial
rejoinder at least may be found in the American experience and the resili-
ence of individual liberty here for the past two hundred years.
Let us begin at the beginning of limited government, with John
Locke, whose influence on this nation's founding generation was consid-
erable. He wrote that "when any number of Men have, by the consent of
every individual, made a Community, they have thereby made that Commu-
nity one Body, with a Power to Act as one Body, which is only by the will
and determination of the majority."18 This and nothing more is what I
mean by characterizing the federal government as a sovereign entity. As
I've written previously, "[a]lthough casting off the autocracy of historical
monarchy and being grounded instead upon democratic approval, the
United States is a sovereign government, empowered to act for the collec-
tive good in an authoritative manner, distinct from any private individual
or private organization."19
For two hundred years, the federal government has exercised sover-
eignty in this sense of being empowered to act for the popular majority
without being subject to all of the restrictions that rightly constrain an
individual while interacting with his or her neighbors. And, with a few sad
but temporary deviations, the United States government has assumed this
form of sovereignty without a catastrophic blow to liberty, a loss of demo-
cratic accountability, or denial of the rule of law. One may be troubled
about the growth of government, especially at the national level, and one
may decry the proliferation of law and regulation as corrosive to liberty, as
I do. But these problems cannot be laid at the doorstep of federal sover-
eignty and sovereign immunity.
Still, as I said at the outset, I do confess that my purpose in this Article
is more prosaic and less ambitious than the scholarly endeavors of those
who have thoughtfully explored the concept, history, jurisprudence, and
theology of sovereignty. Moreover, I do take the point of those who pro-
test that when a government entity or official must share power with
others and is constrained by constitutional limitations, the term "sover-
eign" may be misplaced. If it were to take root in our legal and political
discourse, another term would meet with no objection from me, other
than perhaps on grounds of style. In preference to the language of sover-
eignty, Pavlos Eleftheriadis of the Oxford University Faculty of Law speaks
alternatively of "a scheme of political dominion under the civil condi-
17. See generally FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944) (expres-
sing fear that populist redistributionist policies and welfare state would lead to loss
of liberty).
18. JOHN LOCKE, Two TRFATIsEs OF GOVERNMENT 331 (Peter Laslett ed., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) (emphasis added); see also OREsTEs A. BROWNSON,
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 68 (Regnery Pub. Inc., 2003) (1865) ("The political sover-
eignty, under the law of nature, attaches to the people, not individually, but collec-
tively, as civil or political society.").
19. Sisk, supra note 7, at 526.
902 [ol. 55: p. 899
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tion" 20-although that more descriptive phrase is something of a
mouthful.
In any event, my focus in this Article is on judicial intervention in
political decisions made by the government, rather than defending sover-
eignty more generally. Saying that he did not endorse the suggestion that
the Founders were committed "to the universal availability of individually
adequate remediation of legal wrongs" by the government, Patrick Bren-
nan explained that he spoke "not so much against sovereign immunity, as
against sovereignty."2 1 In this symposium Article, I write not so much in
favor of sovereignty, as in favor of sovereign immunity.
In defending sovereign immunity, I should not be understood as say-
ing too much or speaking too broadly. When I profess the baseline con-
cept of sovereign immunity, I do not mean thereby to defend the dignity
or majesty of the federal government as though it were an exalted person-
age. I certainly do not wish to preserve the absolute authority of a sover-
eign king in the medieval tradition or the supreme state of the totalitarian
variety. And, as for the age-old question about separate sovereignties for
Church and State, I touch on that subject only to affirm the legitimacy of
religious sentiments in making non-sectarian political judgments.
As I use the term here, the doctrine of "sovereign immunity" means
nothing more than that the judiciary is restricted in its ability to substitute
its judgment for how government should act for the choices made by the
political branches. As Richard Pierce says in his administrative law trea-
tise, when defending discretionary function immunity from governmental
tort liability, "[t]he process of governing almost always helps some and
hurts others, but those who are hurt should not necessarily be entitled to
damages from the government."2 2
Objecting to the sort of argument that I present here, Donald
Doernberg argues that attempts to "marry both sovereign immunity and
the rule of law" ultimately lead to "an extraordinary degree of cognitive
dissonance."23 As applied to sovereign immunity at the federal level, I
simply disagree. To be sure, if one equates the rule of law with a judicial
20. Eleftheriadis, supra note 14, at 37-39.
21. Brennan, supra note 14, at 185 n.18, 193. As for the expressed views of the
Founders, Alexander Hamilton wrote in The Federalist No. 81 that "[i]t is inherent
in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without
its consent." THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 487-88 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961). Likewise,John Marshall, who would later become ChiefJustice
of the United States, assured the Virginia convention that "[i]t is not rational to
suppose that the sovereign power could be dragged before a court." 3 THE DE-
BATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CON-
STITUTION 555-56 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836).
22. 3 RICHARDJ. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 19.4, at 1435 (4th
ed. 2002).
23. DONALD L. DOERNBERG, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OR THE RULE OF LAw: THE
NEW FEDERALISM'S CHOICE 12 (2005).
903
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decree, then sovereign immunity obviously undermines the rule of law by
obstructing judicial intervention.
If, however, sovereignty in the United States resides with the people,
who are represented at the federal level in Congress assembled and by an
elected President, then the rule of law may be protected in many, perhaps
most, instances by resort to democratic processes. To again quote John
Locke, when people create a "Political Society" by mutual consent, "the
Community comes to be Umpire, by settled standing rules." 24 And if
those government officials authorized to speak for the community fail to
uphold their legal duties, they are subject to removal. As Doernberg aptly
reminds us, in American history, "[clonsent of the governed became a
continuous process."25
Now to the extent that the federal government were to be granted
personhood separate from the people that form it by their political con-
sent, I wholly concur with Doernberg that "[t]he true sovereignty in a
Lockean society remained at all times with the members of the society
collectively; it never passed to the government."2 6 But in the United
States, at least with respect to non-constitutional matters, that may be a
distinction without a difference. The "One Body" that Locke says is em-
powered to act by direction of the majority is sovereign in a collective
sense, as the embodiment of that popular majority.2 7
Sovereign immunity thus may be reconciled with and even enhance
popular sovereignty. In an autocratic or totalitarian system, permitting the
sovereign to withhold permission to claims against itself in court would be
a cause for great concern. But in a democratic society, reserving to the
sovereign the power to consent to suit against itself ultimately means re-
serving the power to govern to the people. In addition, democratic
processes also remain available-by political means other than the judicial
process-to directly redress grievances.28
Arguing that sovereignty was effectively renounced by the Founders,
Brennan portrays the American Revolution as a battle against sover-
eignty.29 But, as Bernard Bailyn explains, the theoretically intricate ques-
tion of sovereignty arose from the more "basic problems" of
"[r]epresentation and consent, constitution and rights" during the Revolu-
tionary Era.30 Among the earliest sparks that eventually caught fire in the
24. LOCKE, supra note 18, at 324. For further discussion of Locke and sover-
eignty, see generally DOERNBERG, supra note 23, at 45-63.
25. DOERNBERG, supra note 23, at 67.
26. Id. at 57.
27. See alojORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FAcTs AND NoRMs 89 (William Rehg
trans., 1998) ("[T]he source of all legitimacy lies in the democratic lawmaking
process, and this in turn calls on the principle of popular sovereignty.").
28. See infra Part II.D.
29. Brennan, supra note 14, at 176.
30. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
198 (1967).
904 [Vol. 55: p. 899
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Revolutionary War was the vigorous protest against "taxation without rep-
resentation," as the colonists were subjected to taxes by an English Parlia-
ment in which Americans were not represented.3 1 Most acutely and in
down-to-earth terms, then, the American Patriots fought and died for the
freedom to elect their own representatives to make the laws that would
govern them. As political scientist Robert Dahl emphasizes, "[t]he right to
self-government through the democratic process is itself one of the most
fundamental rights a person can possess."3 2
This fundamental right of self-government could be undermined by
undue expansion of judicial review over governmental decisions, even if
the judges were to defend their interventions on the grounds of accounta-
bility or popular sovereignty or by dismissing sovereign immunity as an
anachronism ill-suited to modern sensibilities or theories of social justice.
As Lawrence Rosenthal says, "whenever ajudge or jury unilaterally directs
a commitment of government resources to a particular plaintiff, requiring
the imposition of additional taxes or a reordering of budgetary priorities,
republican values are compromised."3 3
In sum, when the decisions of the political community are challenged
by individuals who dissent on political grounds or regard themselves as
personally aggrieved, an entity must be recognized that is capable of
speaking for the whole and resisting the reach of unelected judges
tempted to question the wisdom of those decisions made through demo-
cratic governance. By necessity, that entity is the government and the na-
ture of that resistance is sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity thereby
bolsters popular sovereignty by restraining the legal elite from imposing
their policy preferences and by denying judges the power to evaluate the
prudence of the political choices made by the majority.
B. Federal Sovereign Immunity as a Manifestation of
Constitutional Separation of Powers
On sovereign immunity and constitutional separation of powers, Har-
old Krent explains sovereign immunity as "deriv[ing] not from the infalli-
bility of the state but from a desire to maintain a proper balance among
the branches of the federal government, and from a proper commitment
to majoritarian rule."3 4 When deciding whether to waive federal sovereign
immunity, Krent writes, "Congress plausibly may conclude that the poten-
31. See ROBERT MIDDLEKAUFF, THE GLoRIous CAUSE 76-93 (1982).
32. ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 169 (1989).
33. Lawrence Rosenthal, A Theory of Government Damages Liability: Torts, Consti-
tutional Torts, and Takings, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 797, 846 (2007). Rosenthal con-
cludes that, while the "ordinary process of political accountability" is generally
preferable, a measure of governmental tort liability is necessary "to produce some
degree of political pressure on government to invest in loss prevention." Id. at 853-
855.
34. Harold J. Krent, Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity, 45 VAND. L. REv.
1529, 1530 (1992).
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tial harm to majoritarian policymaking from damage actions outweighs
the benefits in added deterrence of tortious conduct by the government,
increased efficiency in contracting, and more equitable compensation of
injured parties."35
On the imperative question of how to uphold individual rights and
remedies while preserving democratic rule, Krent concludes, "we trust
Congress, unlike any other entity, to set the rules of the game."36
Given the constitutional reservation of monetary appropriations to
Congress,3 7 and the absence of a textual constitutional basis for awarding
money damages for constitutional wrongs (with a few distinct exceptions,
such as the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment),38 the immunity of
the federal government from a money judgment in court is well-grounded
in our national charter.3 9 Moreover, Vicki Jackson submits that "[w]hat
we call the 'sovereign immunity' of the United States in many respects
could be described instead as a particularized elaboration of Congress'
control over the lower court's jurisdiction."40 In sum, sovereign immunity
and the Constitution need not be adversaries.
As a matter of public and social policy, imposing liability on govern-
ment also may have severe consequences "on governmental budgeting, or
on those who depend on government budgets for the variety of social
goods allocated through that process."4 1 In terms of social justice, Gerald
Frug warns that "[t]he allocation of scarce resources by court order is not
35. Id. at 1531.
36. Id. By contrast, the late Kenneth Culp Davis contended that the doctrine
of sovereign immunity was unnecessary as a "judicial tool," because we may trust
the courts to refrain from interfering in crucial governmental activities, such as the
execution of foreign affairs and military policies, by limiting themselves to matters
appropriate for judicial determination and within the competence of the judiciary.
See Kenneth Culp Davis, Sovereign Immunity Must Go, 22 ADMIN. L. REv. 383, 395(1970).
37. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 ("No Money shall be drawn from the Trea-
sury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.").
38. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V. For further discussion of the history of statu-
tory provision for takings claims against the United States, and the Supreme Court
interpretation of that statute, see generally Sisk, supra note 7, at 566-71.
39. See Rosenthal, supra note 33, at 802-03; see also Paul F. Figley & Jay
Tidmarsh, The Appropriations Power and Sovereign Immunity, 107 MICH. L. REv. 1207,
1258 (2009) (asserting close connection between sovereign immunity and congres-
sional appropriations power, saying that "shared understanding" of both support-
ers and opponents of Constitution during framing period "was that legislatures,
which controlled appropriations from the public treasury, controlled the award of
claims against the sovereign"); Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sover-
eignty, Immunity, and judicial Independence, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 521, 545(2003) (saying Appropriations Clause "lends force to the argument that moneyjudgments against the United States cannot be paid without an appropriation from
Congress") (emphasis added).
40. Jackson, supra note 39, at 570.
41. Rosenthal, supra note 33, at 845.
906 [Vol. 55: p. 899
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likely to be from the fortunate to the powerless; it is already the powerless
to whom the state largely directs its resources."42
Now the courts should intervene to insist that the political branches
abide by the constitutional rules of the game. But whether the federal
government may be restrained through judicial review from undertaking
or continuing along an unconstitutional course is not really in much
doubt. The Supreme Court has long since recognized a "constitutional
exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity."43 In any event, the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act expressly waives the sovereign immunity of the
United States for lawsuits, other than those seeking money damages, that
challenge action, including when the government has acted "contrary to
constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity."44 And, of course,
when the government itself has called upon the judiciary to issue a judg-
ment, either civil or criminal, against a citizen (that is, when the govern-
ment is the plaintiff or prosecutor), sovereign immunity has never had
much play. The citizen ordinarily may raise constitutional or statutory,
and sometimes common-law, defenses.4 5 Indeed, the rule of law is most
powerfully realized, and most urgently needed, when the citizen is a defen-
dant against the government in court.
By contrast, we do not promote the rule of law by referring questions
infused with policy considerations to the courts. On questions of political
advisability, social justice, and moral philosophy, judges have no special
competence. That is not to say that social justice or moral principles have
no claim on the exercise ofjudicial power. Still, I do insist that judges are
not well-equipped to decide those controversies that are best framed as
political or moral questions. If we waive sovereign immunity too precip-
itously or expand governmental liability too extravagantly, we injudiciously
ask jurists to step out of their constitutionally-assigned legal role and in-
stead speak as political or moral actors. In a democratic society, questions
of conscience in public policy should be reserved to the people and those
they elect to office.
During most of our country's history, the debate about federal sover-
eign immunity in the Supreme Court, and whether immunity extended as
well to officers of the federal government, revolved around alleged com-
42. Gerald E. Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 715, 741-
42 (1978).
43. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 696
(1949). For a discussion of the constitutional exception to sovereign immunity,
see generally GREGORY C. SISK, LITIGATION WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT§ 2.02(b) (5), at 89-90 (4th ed. 2006).
44. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706(2) (B) (1970). For a discussion of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act as a waiver of sovereign immunity, see generally SIsK, supra note
43, § 4.10(b)-(c), at 333-36.
45. For a discussion of the United States government as a civil plaintiff in
court, see generally SISK, supra note 43, at 503-37.
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mon-law wrongs.46 That debate carried through the 1882 decision of
United States v. Lee,47 in which the plaintiff sought to eject military officials
from property seized during the Civil War and later dedicated as Arlington
National Cemetery, to the 1949 decision in Larson v. Domestic & Foreign
Commerce Corp.,48 in which the plaintiff sought specific performance of a
government contract by bringing suit against the agency administrator. In
these and other cases, the Supreme Court struggled with the question
whether the decisions and actions of government that allegedly were un-
lawful under substantive common-law could be reviewed by the courts, ab-
sent a waiver of sovereign immunity."9 Ultimately, the Supreme Court
ruled that, absent congressional authorization, "[t]he Government, as rep-
resentative of the community as a whole, cannot be stopped in its tracks by
any plaintiff who presents a disputed question of property or contract
right," that is, a common-law claim of right.50
Accordingly, my focus in the next subpart of this Article is on that
question which has dominated the historical debate about federal sover-
eign immunity: whether the federal government, directly or through its
agents, may be held liable under the common law, absent an express statu-
tory waiver of sovereign immunity. In other words, the subject of my atten-
tion here is not the unauthorized use of government power, but rather the
allegedly harmful use of government power exercised according to consti-
tutional authority.
C. Defending the Legitimacy of Federal Sovereign Immunity Even in
the Hard Case: The Texas City Disaster of 1947
If one presumes to defend sovereign immunity, then one must be
ready and willing to defend it in the hard case, where the harm was great
and the plea of the injured is most compelling. In this subpart of the
Article, I relate a tragic story of staggering loss of life and massive property
damage for which the federal government was directly responsible and
which should have been prevented or mitigated, even though the exigen-
cies for the government's actions were equally great. The story is that of
the "Texas City Disaster" of 1947, which came before the Supreme Court
four years later in the landmark case of Dalehite v. United States.5 1
46. See id. § 5.07(a), at 373 (noting that "common-law suits for ordinary torts
against individuals who happened to be government employees, even when those
employees were acting within the scope of their government duties," had "been
attempted since the early days of the Republic").
47. 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
48. 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
49. For a discussion of the history of federal sovereign immunity in the Su-
preme Court, see generally Gregory C. Sisk, A Primer on the Doctrine ofFederal Sover-
eign Immunity, 58 OKLA. L. REv. 439, 446-56 (2005).
50. Larson, 337 U.S. at 704.
51. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
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1. The Devastation of Europe After World War II and the American Response
The beginning of the story of the Texas City Disaster requires us to go
back to the end of another story, one of war and misery. That preface
began on May 8, 1945. As military historian John Keegan paints the pic-
ture of that day: "In Britain and America crowds thronged the streets ...
to celebrate 'VE-Day'; in the Europe to which their soldiers had brought
victory, the vanquished and their victims scratched for food and shelter in
the ruins the war had wrought."5 2 Prior to the formal surrender of Ger-
many that ended the Second World War in Europe, foreign correspon-
dent Anne O'Hare McCormick of the New York Times wrote: "The human
problem the war will leave behind has not yet been imagined, much less
faced by anybody. There has never been such destruction, such disinte-
gration of the structure of life."5 3
When Germany surrendered on May 8, 1945, more than thirteen mil-
lion people already were displaced in Europe, wandering homeless
through the devastated countryside. 54 By 1946, the newly formed United
Nations reported that 100 million people in Europe were so malnourished
that their health was seriously endangered.5 5 As President Truman later
recalled, "[m]ore people faced starvation during the year following the
war than during all of the war years combined."5 6 With the expulsion of
the ethnic German populations from Eastern Europe by the advancing
Soviet army, as many as a million German civilians had perished from ex-
posure, trauma, or starvation, with millions more destitute refugees flood-
ing into the western zones of occupied Germany.5 7
As the situation in Europe became desperate, the Soviet Union was
poised to take advantage by both exercise of military force and by political
appeal to remove ever larger regions of Europe behind the Iron Curtain.
The Soviet Union already had established coercive control over even such
anti-Bolshevik nations in Eastern Europe as Poland and Romania.5 8 The
Russian occupation sector in Germany was the heart of the worst privation,
with some cities, such as Berlin, rendered seventy-five percent uninhabit-
able, while the occupying Soviet army took savage revenge on the defeated
population, raping as many as two million German women.5 9 Communist
guerillas were engaged in a civil war against the elected government in
52. JOHN KEEGAN, THE SECOND WORLD WAR 533 (1989).
53. GREG BEHRMAN, THE MOST NOBLE ADvENTURE: THE MARSHALL PLAN AND
THE TIME WHEN AMERICA HELPED SAVE EUROPE 23 (2007).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 23-24.
56. Id. at 23 (characterizing Truman's later writings).
57. See KEEGAN, supra note 52, at 592-93.
58. See MARK MAZOWER, HrrLER's EMPIRE: HOW THE NAZIs RULED EUROPE 567-
58 (2008).
59. BEHRMAN, supra note 53, at 23.
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Greece, while the formidable Soviet army was threatening Turkey.6 0 Else-
where in Europe, Soviet-sponsored communist movements promised that
an all-powerful state would bring an end to the suffering. In 1946 elec-
tions, communist parties in France and Italy received twenty-nine and forty
percent of the vote respectively.6 1
Speaking in Zurich in 1946, Winston Churchill reported that " [o]ver
wide areas a vast quivering mass of tormented, hungry, careworn, and be-
wildered human beings gape at the ruins of their cities and homes, and
scan the dark horizons for the approach of some new peril, tyranny, or
terror."62 Churchill continued: "Indeed but for the fact that the great Re-
public across the Atlantic Ocean has at length realized that the ruin or
enslavement of Europe would involve their own fate as well, and has
stretched out hands of succor and of guidance, but for that the Dark Ages
would have returned in all their cruelty and squalor."6 3 "Gentlemen,"
Churchill warned, "they may still return."6 4
The following winter was one of the most brutal in living memory,
adding frost-bite to hunger and making hunger worse. In a parody of the
Beatitudes, a graffiti artist in Berlin sermonized from the shattered walls of
the Reichstag: "Blessed are the dead, for their hands do not freeze."6 5 In
France and Italy, millions of acres of autumn wheat were lost to the cold
and snow. 66 As British historian Alan Bullock observed, by reason of freez-
ing temperatures and twenty-foot-high piles of snow, "British industrial
production was effectively halted for three weeks-something German
bombing had never been able to do."67 By 1947, Churchill had become
even more alarmed, describing Europe as "a rubble-heap, a charnel house,
a breeding ground of pestilence and hate."68
Across the Atlantic, the American administration in early 1947 was
gravitating toward a two-pronged foreign policy for the post-war era.
Under what came to be known as the Truman Doctrine, the United States
had adopted a policy of containment toward the Soviet Union, promising
both military aid to pro-western governments and American military inter-
vention when necessary.6 9 The second half of American policy was "the
60. JAMES T. PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE UNITED STATES, 1945-
1974, at 126-28 (1996).
61. BEHRMAN, supra note 53, at 29.
62. Winston Churchill, Speech to the Academic Youth, Zurich (Sept. 9,
1946), available at http://www.europa-web.de/europa/02wwswww/202histo/
churchil.htm.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. BEHRMAN, supra note 53, at 25.
66. Id.
67. ALAN BULLOCK, ERNEST BEVIN: FOREIGN SECRETARY 1945-1951, at 361
(1983).
68. PATTERSON, supra note 60, at 130 (citing ROBERT H. FERRELL, HARRY S.
TRUMAN: A LIFE 71 (1994)).
69. Id. at 128-29.
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so-called Marshall Plan of economic aid to western Europe,"7 0 what was
formally titled the European Recovery Program.7 1
At the Harvard commencement ceremony in 1947, the new Secretary
of State and former Army Chief of Staff, George C. Marshall, assured the
assembled graduates and their faculty and families that the United States
was now "deeply conscious of our responsibilities in the world."7 2 An-
nouncing a concerted program against "hunger, poverty, desperation, and
chaos" in Europe, Marshall maintained that
[t]he truth of the matter is that Europe's requirements for the
next three or four years of foreign food and other essential prod-
ucts-principally from America-are so much greater than her
present ability to pay that she must have substantial additional
help or face economic, social, and political deterioration of a
very grave character.7 3
Adverting to the strategic and national security motives behind the plan,
Marshall urged his audience to appreciate "the plight and consequent re-
actions of the long-suffering peoples [in these distant troubled areas], and
the effect of those reactions on their governments in connection with our
efforts to promote peace in the world."74 As foreign relations scholar
Greg Behrman summarizes, this new Marshall Plan "would transform Eu-
rope, dramatically reconfigure the international political landscape, and
launch America forward as a modern superpower with global
responsibilities."7 5
2. The Texas City Disaster
By the time that Marshall spoke at Harvard in June, 1947, the plan
that would bear his name was already underway. As a central part of
American efforts to redevelop the devastated nations of Europe, the
United States government was ramping up production of fertilizer for agri-
cultural use overseas, as direct shipment of foodstuffs for all needs was not
practicable.76 The primary ingredient in the only fertilizer that could be
produced in sufficient quantities was ammonium nitrate, which had also
been used in explosives during the war.77 In particular, decommissioned
ordnance plants were well-suited for the task and were re-fitted to produce
70. Id. at 129.
71. MAZOWER, supra note 58, at 569.
72. George C. Marshall, Sec'y of State, Commencement Address at Harvard
University (June 5, 1947), available at http://www.usaid.gov/multimedia/video/
marshall/marshallspeech.html.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. BEHRMAN, supra note 53, at 2.
76. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 19 (1953).
77. In re Texas City Disaster Litigation, 197 F.2d 771, 777 (5th Cir. 1952) (en
banc).
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fertilizer rather than bombs.78 To prevent caking and hardening of the
fertilizer by water absorption, which would make it difficult to store and
later spread on farm-land, the fertilizer was coated with a water-repellent
mixture of petrolatum, rosin, and paraffin (PRP)."
On April 15, 1947, thousands of tons of newly-manufactured fertilizer
had been loaded on to two ships operated by the French government, the
Grandcamp and the High Flyer, which were anchored in the harbor at Texas
City, Texas.8 0 On April 16, 1947, smoke was sighted rising out of the hold
of the Grandcamp.8 ' The cause of the fire was never definitely established.
Hugh Stevens, who has written the most comprehensive documentary on
the disaster, concludes that the blaze was started by a crewman's "care-
lessly discarded cigarette."82 A federal district court judge later concluded
that the volatile mixture of fertilizer had combusted spontaneously." A
majority of the Supreme Court could only say that the ignition of the fer-
tilizer was "a complex result of the interacting factors of mass, heat, pres-
sure and composition."84
Shortly after the smoke was seen, the Grandcamp's hatches were closed
and steam was introduced into the hold.85 But such efforts were to no
avail and indeed likely made things worse by increasing temperatures and
pressure inside the closed hold toward "the critical point."8 6 Moreover, at
high temperatures, ammonium nitrate can itself produce the oxygen to
feed a fire,87 and the water-repellent and combustible nature of the car-
bon-based PRP coating further reduced the temperature at which the fer-
tilizer could ignite.88
After only about an hour, as Texas City fire-fighting crews arrived and
crowds including school-children gathered on the docks to watch the
fire,8 9 the ship exploded with such force that windows were shattered in
78. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 19-21.
79. Id. at 21.
80. Id. at 22.
81. Id. at 23.
82. HUGH W. STEPHENS, THE TEXAS CITY DISASTER, 1947, at 41 (1997); see also
Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 54-55 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (noting conflicting testimony
about whether seaman had been smoking around hold).
83. See Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 54 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 42 (majority opinion).
85. See id. at 47-48 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
86. STEPHENS, supra note 82, at 34; see alo id. at 31 (describing high tempera-
tures raised by steam as "initiat[ing] thermal decomposition of the fertilizer and
trigger[ing] the explosion").
87. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 23 n.7; see also Moore Memorial Public Library, Texas
City Disaster 1947 Online Exhibition: Fire on the Grandcamp, http://www.texas
city-library.org/TCDisasterExhibit/tcl947p7.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2010).
88. Dalehit, 346 U.S. at 46 (quoting district court finding); STEPHENS, supra
note 82, at 22; see also Brief for Petitioners at 69, Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S.
15 (1953) (No. 308) (citing trial record).
89. STEPHENS, supra note 82, at 34.
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Houston, forty miles away,9 0 the wings of two small airplanes circling
above were sheared off,9 1 and the Grandcamp's one-and-a-half ton anchor
was thrown nearly two miles into the city.9 2
More than 560 people were killed, including spectators, executives,
and employees of companies in the area, as well as half of the city's fire-
men.9 3 Three thousand more people were injured.9 4 Many of the on-
lookers who had survived the initial blast, but lay injured on the docks,
were drowned by the fifteen-foot tidal wave created by the exploding
Grandcamp that swept ashore and then receded back into the bay.9 5 One
witness described the survivors in the dock area: "Grotesque figures they
were, black with fuel oil and smoke, and red with their own and comrades'
blood, walking with arms broken and dangling, or crawling with mangled
legs and feet."96 Some of the survivors stumbled away naked, as their
clothes had been blown off by the force of the explosion.9 7 With build-
ings, warehouses, propane and benzol tanks, and oil refineries having
been set on fire, others were trapped and burned to death, while broken
water mains prevented efforts to put out the flames.9 8
Although not noticed for many hours in the aftermath of the initial
blast, the fire had spread to the second ship containing the fertilizer, the
High Flyer, which was docked nearby.9 9 After unsuccessful efforts to put
out that fire or tug the ship out to sea, the High Flyer exploded as well,
early on the morning of April 17.100 With evacuations from the dock area,
casualties from the second explosion were light, although they apparently
included Father William Roach of St. Mary's Catholic Church who had
remained behind to tend to the injured and was nearly decapitated by
shrapnel from the second ship explosion.' 0 Witnesses said that the High
Flyer exploded with even more force than had the Grandcamp, further dev-
astating the city.10 2
The successive blasts destroyed the thriving harbor of Texas City, in-
cluding industrial plants, oil refineries, warehouses, wharves, and a grain
90. See Moore Memorial Public Library, Texas City Disaster 1947 Online Exhi-
bition: The First Explosion, http://www.texascity-library.org/TCDisasterExhibit/
tcl947p8.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2010).
91. STEPHENS, supra note 82, at 3.
92. Id. at 40; Brief for Petitioners, supra note 88, at 111 (citing trial record).
93. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 48 (Jackson, J., dissenting); STEPHENS, supra note 82,
at 36, 43; Brief for Petitioners, supra note 88, at 111 (citing trial record).
94. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 48 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
95. STEPHENS, supra note 82, at 36-37.
96. Id. at 48-49 (quoting safety engineer who returned to dock after
explosion).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 53.
99. Id. at 5, 75-82.
100. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 48 (1953) (JacksonJ., dissenting).
101. STEPHENS, supra note 82, at 83.
102. Id. at 83-86.
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elevator, as well as the town hall, a nearby elementary school, and much of
the commercial and residential areas.103
That ammonium nitrate fertilizer can be explosive was a lesson the
nation learned again the hard way a half century later with the domestic
terrorist bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City. The casualty
figures in Texas City in 1947 were almost four times higher.
3. The Texas City Disaster Litigation and the Dalehite Decision
Just one year earlier, in 1946, Congress had enacted the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA), 10 4 which generally waives federal sovereign immunity
for claims against the United States sounding in tort. The FTCA grants
the United States District Courts
exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United
States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1,
1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any em-
ployee of the Government while acting within the scope of his
office or employment, under circumstances where the United
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in ac-
cordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred. 105
Thus, the United States is liable under the FTCA on the same basis and to
the same extent as recovery would be allowed for a tort committed under
like circumstances by a private person in that state.106
Even when Congress has granted consent to suit by statute, however,
sovereign immunity seldom is wholly abrogated. As explained in my trea-
tise on federal government litigation:
While the FTCA does waive federal sovereign immunity for tort
claims generally, the United States remains the beneficiary of sev-
eral special rules and protections, notably including restrictions
on the standards of liability (such as the exclusion of strict liabil-
ity); numerous defined exceptions to liability that bar certain
types of claims (such as claims for assault, libel, misrepresenta-
tion, and interference with contract) and preclude liability aris-
ing out of certain governmental activities (including
discretionary or policymaking functions, transmission of mail,
103. Id. at 44, 47; see also Brief for Petitioners, supra note 88, at 69 (summariz-
ing damage and citing trial record).
104. Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). For a discussion of the Federal Tort Claims Act,
see generally SISK, supra note 43, §§ 3.02-3.08, at 102-87.
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006).
106. See United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43, 44 (2005). For a discussion of the
standards for liability under the FTCA, including the analogy of the government to
a private person, see generally SISK, supra note 43, § 3.05, at 124-40.
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and military combat); restrictions on damages available (preclud-
ing prejudgment interest and punitive damages); and the exclu-
sion of certain categories of people (federal civilian employees
covered by a compensation act and military servicemembers in-
jured incident to service) from eligibility to seek a damages rem-
edy under the FTCA."ov
In particular, the "discretionary function" exception to the FTCA pre-
serves the government's immunity "from liability based upon an em-
ployee's exercise or failure to exercise a discretionary function or duty . . .
whether or not the discretion involved be abused."' 0 8 Thus, when the gov-
ernmental decision at issue in a case was "susceptible to policy analysis,"109
constitutional separation of powers warns the courts not to set out "on an
aggressive course far afield ofjudicial competence and replete with matter
of policy entrusted elsewhere."" 0
After the Texas City Disaster, the survivors brought a series of FTCA
suits against the federal government, alleging tortious wrongdoing in vai-
ous phases of the fertilizer program and production, including the govern-
ment decision to manufacture the fertilizer, the government's
specifications for the manufacturing process, and the transportation of the
fertilizer. The district court granted judgment for the plaintiff after trying
a test case, but the court of appeals sitting en banc reversed.' After
granting certiorari in Dalehite v. United States, a divided Supreme Court
affirmed the dismissal of the claims under the discretionary function
exception.112
The Dalehite Court majority explained the discretionary function ex-
ception as barring any tort suit that projects "into the realm of the validity
of legislation or discretionary administrative action." 13 Saying that
"where there is room for policy judgment and decision there is discre-
tion,"1 4 the Court majority had little difficulty concluding that each of
the decisions in the series made by the government in determining to
manufacture and transport fertilizer for recovery of war-torn nations was
permeated with policy implications. The Cabinet-level decision to pro-
duce fertilizer in an effort to stave off starvation in war-torn countries obvi-
107. Sisk, supra note 7, at 537 (citing FTCA).
108. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2006).
109. See United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 325 (1991) (applying discre-
tionary function exception to FTCA).
110. McMellon v. United States, 387 F.3d 329, 353 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc)
(Wilkinson, J., concurring) (implying discretionary function exception into Suits
in Admiralty Act).
111. In re Texas City Disaster Litigation, 197 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1952) (en
banc).
112. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 17 (1953).
113. Id. at 27.
114. Id. at 36.
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ously involved significant policy factors." 5 Likewise, the Court held the
government specifications for production of the fertilizer were covered by
the discretionary function exception because alternative measures that
might have reduced the volatility of the ammonium nitrate would have
increased the cost of production, delayed shipment, or made the fertilizer
less effective for agricultural use.' 1 6
Justice Jackson, joined by two other members of the Court, dissented
in Dalehite, arguing that the ruling permitted the government to "clothe
official carelessness with a public interest."' 1 7 Despite the majority's pos-
tulation of important policy bases for each of the choices made by the
government in production and transport of the fertilizer, Justice Jackson
argued forcefully that the case involved nothing more than the kind of
"conflict between safety and expediency" that is at the heart of every claim
that an actor failed to exercise due care.'18 After all, Justice Jackson in-
sisted, "[t]he Court certainly would hold a private corporation liable in
this situation, and the statute imposes the same liability upon the
Government. . . ."119
4. Sovereign Immunity and Hard Political Choices
If we were considering the choices made by a private industrial con-
cern about production and shipment of a hazardous product, a court
surely would apply the basic standard of negligence (or even an absolute
standard of strict liability) and almost certainly would impose liability on a
manufacturer for what occurred in the Texas City case. Factors such as
increased cost, delays in production, reduced levels of production, and
reduced effectiveness of the product are regularly weighed by private man-
ufacturers. Yet the courts do not hesitate to second-guess the choices
made by a manufacturer in determining whether the manufacturer was
negligent or should be subject to strict liability.
When policy considerations underlie what might appear to be parallel
governmental conduct, however, the sometimes countervailing factors of
efficiency and risk are weighed not in the pursuit of commercial profit but
to consider which course best advances the common good. In such a situ-
ation, those same factors take on political overtones that are largely absent
in the private context. Thus, in making the choices of whether and how to
act, the government generally proceeds not to obtain economic advantage
but as an exercise in political judgment.
To better understand how this may be so, let us look more closely at
two of the specifications for manufacturing of the fertilizer in 1947, ele-
115. Id. at 37.
116. Id. at 38-41.
117. Id. at 47-60 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 56-57.
119. Id. at 57.
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ments that the district court concluded played major contributing roles in
instigating the Texas City Disaster:
First, as noted earlier, the government decided to coat the ammo-
nium nitrate fertilizer with a carbon-based water repellent sealant known
as PRP. Because this coating itself was combustible, and also reduced the
temperature at which the fertilizer could ignite, the district court found
that "f[m]ore than any other one thing ... this coating made this commod-
ity one of the most dangerous of explosives." 120 But, as the Supreme
Court majority in Dalehite explained: "At stake was no mere matter of taste;
ammonium nitrate when wet, cakes and is difficult to spread on fields as a
fertilizer. So the considerations that dictated the decisions were crucial
ones, involving the feasibility of the program itself . . ."121
Second, the district court heavily faulted the bagging and shipment of
the fertilizer at high temperatures as a likely cause of spontaneous com-
bustion in the hold of the Grandcamp.12 2 But again the government's deci-
sion on bagging temperatures was not made haphazardly or with disregard
for alternatives. While, in retrospect, it is possible that bagging the fertil-
izer at high temperatures may have increased the instability of the fertil-
izer mix, reducing those temperatures by holding the product in graining
kettles for a longer period of time or by installing cooling equipment
would have significantly raised costs and reduced production.123 Indeed,
in response to a suggestion to bag the fertilizer at 120 degrees rather than
at 200 degrees, the commanding officers at the ordnance plants reported
that this would reduce production to less than one-half of the projected
need for fertilizer in war-torn regions.124
Thus, we are brought face-to-face with the hard political questions
raised by the Texas City Disaster case: How high a risk was justified in
manufacturing and shipping a potentially dangerous product as a central
part of an emergency response to a human catastrophe unfolding in Eu-
rope? Is the level of acceptable risk greater if the policy is not only one of
humanitarian relief but necessary to preserve world security and interna-
tional liberty, by giving hope to desperate people tempted to turn to totali-
tarianism to end their suffering? Indeed, what if the alternative to
expeditious action may be another war? What changes should have been
made in manufacturing specifications and what additional safety measures
should have been taken, while knowing that such steps would delay ship-
ment and slash production of an essential tool in rejuvenating agriculture
in Europe? Moreover, how should elected leaders and their appointees
weigh the likelihood that increases in costs will test the patience of the
120. Id. at 46 (appendix quoting district court finding).
121. Id. at 40 (majority opinion).
122. See id. at 47 (appendix quoting district court finding); Brief for Petition-
ers, supra note 88, at 69 (citing trial record).
123. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 40-41.
124. In re Texas City Disaster Litigation, 197 F.2d 771, 779 (5th Cir. 1952) (en
banc).
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American taxpayer who has been greatly burdened with the expenses of
waging a world war and now is being asked to finance an ambitious and
unprecedented program of foreign aid? (To the extent that simple
human error played a role in the disaster, particularly in the government's
failure to warn shippers and others along the path of transportation of the
potential dangers of the fertilizer and to be prepared for emergency re-
sponse if necessary, these mistakes too may be difficult to separate from
the exigencies of the situation. Moreover, this phase of the operation
must also be evaluated in light of the destitution and dangers posed by
instability in Europe, as well as the downsizing of government operations
and military demobilization following World War II.)
5. Sovereign Immunity, Political judgments, and judicial Restraint
In my own opinion, the risk taken in the Texas City Disaster case was
too high and the efforts to reduce the risk were woefully inadequate. Be-
cause the United States government's first responsibility is to the safety of
its own people, the manufacturing of an explosive product without addi-
tional safety measures and transportation of it through a populated area
without greater care and notice of the danger to the local community was
inexcusable.1 2 5 I agree with Justice Jackson's dissent in Dalehite to this ex-
tent: "This was a man-made disaster; it was in no sense an 'act of God.' 12 6
In plain terms, the United States government betrayed the public trust.
But I emphasize that I am making a political, not a legal, judgment
here. I am accusing the government of policy misjudgment, not of legal
negligence. And, I must acknowledge, the starving masses in Europe
might have reached a very different conclusion than have I, sitting com-
fortably in my law school office decades after the fact and far from the
refugee camps of the post-war era. Europeans suffering in the wake of the
war understandably might have regarded any meaningful delay or reduc-
tion in shipments of life-sustaining agricultural supplies as intolerable.
Unavoidably, lives were at stake, on both sides of the equation. And
therein lies the tragedy.
Opponents of sovereign immunity may assure us that the courts
would act prudently on the merits in such a case, refraining from impos-
ing liability by judicious application of common-law principles. Pointing
to Learned Hand's famous negligence formula for balancing risks and
utilities,12 7 they might suggest that such a cost-benefit model adequately
captures the countervailing values and would counsel judicial deference to
government decisions, even without sovereign immunity. But introducing
political, social, and moral values so directly into the tort liability calculus
125. See STEPHENS, supra note 82, at 18 (describing "the apparent ignorance
and indifference of officials about the hazardous potential of the fertilizer, the
absence of governmental supervision over dock operations, and the weakness of
safety management and practices there").
126. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 48 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
127. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
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would be troubling and unworkable. Would we really contemplate a court
openly balancing the prospect of mass starvation and war in Europe
against the risks of injury posed by particular government responses within
our own borders? And how would the court measure and allocate weight
to and among the various policy and value factors? To engage in in-
formed balancing, wouldn't the court have to hold extended hearings on
political and foreign policy, including adversarial witnesses who challenge
the government's understanding of the situation, choice of priorities, and
means of implementing those policy decisions?
That eminent scholar of administrative law, Louis Jaffe, writing with
specific reference to the Texas City Disaster case, acknowledged that "[a] n
attempt to transmute in the alembic of negligence these competing con-
siderations [of costs, alternatives, risks, and public interest] into a judg-
ment of 'reasonableness"' would only confirm the unsuitability of the
judicial process for such matters.128 Thus, Jaffe concluded, something
like the discretionary function exception to the FTCA "must obtain, if only
because ... a court cannot undertake to determine whether complex gov-
ernment decisions are 'reasonable.'"1 29 If the courts were to accept com-
mon-law review on the merits of an allegedly negligent or otherwise
wrongful governmental action that hinges on disputed questions of policy,
the traditional legal standard of reasonableness would too easily shade
into an evaluation of political wisdom.
In sum, the Texas City Disaster, considered in the full context of what
the government was trying to do and why it was trying to do it, raises many
difficult questions: questions of political prudence, questions of foreign
policy, questions of national security, questions of budgetary allocations
and use of taxpayer resources, questions of domestic safety and well-being,
and questions of social justice. These, however, are not legal questions,
and they should not be answered by a court of law.
For these reasons, the doctrine of federal sovereign immunity prop-
erly removes these questions from the judiciary and reserves them to the
political branches for resolution by democratic means. In the words of a
federal appellate court two decades ago:
The wellspring of the discretionary function exception is the doc-
trine of separation of powers. Simply stated, principles of separa-
tion of powers mandate that the judiciary refrain from deciding
questions consigned to the concurrent branches of the govern-
ment. If substantial constitutional issues are not implicated, the
128. Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77
HARv. L. REv. 209, 236 (1963).
129. Id. at 237.
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wisdom of decisions made by the executive and legislative
branches are not subject to judicial review. 3 0
D. Federal Sovereign Immunity and the Demands of justice
The story of the Texas City Disaster does not end with the Supreme
Court's dismissal of the FTCA lawsuit against the United States. After the
Court held the government immune from liability in Dalehite, Congress
provided a legislative remedy by enacting a private bill providing compen-
sation to the victims of the Texas City Disaster.1 3 1
As evidenced by the Texas City episode, "political forces come
powerfully into play when the government endangers the public's safety,
even when there is immunity from liability."1 32 Louis Jaffe cited the statu-
tory compensation in the Texas City case as "serv[ing] to emphasize that
the damage action is only one, and not always the best, method for provid-
ing compensation when the government miscalculates."133
Political accountability persists and can be a giant when awakened. In
a democratic society, sovereign immunity and judicial restraint leave am-
ple room for arguments based upon social justice and morality. The
venue shifts, however, from the courtroom to the public square.
Affirming sovereign immunity as a restraint on oversight by unelected
judges need not, and should not, entail licensing government agents to act
with impunity or inflict harm on citizens without recourse. Nor need one
deny the ultimate sovereignty of God or the primordial claims of natural
law to say that democratic processes should be the primary instrument for
bringing government into alignment with moral demands. Indeed, I sub-
mit that moral principles and the traditional understanding of natural law
are more likely to be advanced in the open political engagement of citi-
zens in democratic governance than in the elite chambers of judges.
Jesus observed that "[a] prophet is not without honor except in his
native place and in his own house."' 3 4 He could have added as well that a
prophet is without honor in a modern American courtroom. But this is as
it should be. Far from being prophetic, the rule of law is crafted to be
steady and dependable. And when the law courts presume to utter words
of prophecy or philosophy, we are likely to cringe. Whatever one's view
on the question of abortion, most readers of Supreme Court opinions re-
main at least a little embarrassed about the plurality's "sweet-mystery-of-
130. In rejoint Eastern and Southern Districts Asbestos Litigation (Robinson
v. United States), 891 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1989). In the interests of full disclosure,
the author of this Article was appellate counsel for the government in this case.
131. See Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 802 (1972) (reporting enactment of
compensation legislation for Texas City disaster victims).
132. Rosenthal, supra note 33, at 849.
133. Jaffe, supra note 128, at 237.
134. See Matthew 13:57 (New American).
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life" passage on the meaning of liberty in Planned Parenthood v. Casey."
The voice of the prophet should be heard in the bully pulpit, not in the
court temple.
Richard John Neuhaus argued that public policy should be informed
by "the operative values of the American people, values that are over-
whelmingly grounded in religious belief."1 36 Moral and religious values
are better brought to bear in public debate than in legal briefs. When
Stephen Carter wrote about the need for "independent moral voices inter-
posed between the citizen and the state,"13 7 he was referring to religious
and voluntary associations, not to judicial guardians. As Ronald Allen said
pointedly many years ago, " [w]ith all due respect to the hard-working and
honorable members of the Court, past and present, for whom in fact I
have enormous respect, they are not collectively a group that commands
our fealty because of the profundity of their moral insight."' 3 8
When a matter of great moral weight has substantial consequences for
the common good, the people are entitled to be heard. But their voices
are not likely to be welcome in the halls ofjustice. Adjudication and legal
dialect distort discussion of values and exclude the general public from
the deliberation. For the average American, who is not a member of the
priestly class of our civil religion of law and lawyers, the courtroom and
language of the law are alien and alienating.
To be sure, the claim of individual justice for an individual wrong
should be heard, and the court is often the proper venue to hear it. Indi-
viduals who have been injured by the government through "ordinary com-
mon-law torts" should be compensated in court.1 3 9 But when the matter is
not ordinary and the government action instead is suffused with policy
implications, the demands of democratic governance may properly take
priority over the adjudication of an individual lawsuit. In such cases, the
call to justice should never be far from the council of government.
In Dalehite v. United States, referring to the magnitude of the human
tragedy in the Texas City Disaster and the correspondingly large amount
of damages sought in court, Justice Jackson complained that dismissal of
the lawsuit on sovereign immunity grounds meant "the ancient and dis-
credited doctrine that 'The King can do no wrong' has not been up-
rooted; it has merely been amended to read, 'The King can do only little
135. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) ("At
the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of mean-
ing, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life."); see also Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 588 (2003) (Scalia,J., dissenting) (ridiculing Casey plurality's "famed
sweet-mystery-of-life" passage).
136. RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBuc SQUARE 12 (1984).
137. STEPHEN L. CARTER, GOD'S NAME IN VAIN 16 (2000).
138. Ronald J. Allen, Constitutional Adjudication, the Demands of Knowledge, and
Epistemological Modesty, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 436, 440 (1993).
139. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 28 (1953) (describing purpose of
FTCA).
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wrongs."1 40 But he was proven wrong in the aftermath of that very case.
Through ordinary democratic processes, the nation recognized its respon-
sibility to the victims of the Texas City Disaster and enacted compensation
legislation. Indeed, the very greatness of the harm done made it all the
more likely that the moral claim would resonate in the public square.
III. REALIZING THE PROMISE OF STATUTORY WAIVERS OF
FEDERAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
As I repeat in this Article, "the emergence of something like sovereign
immunity probably was inevitable."14 ' I also have contended, however,
that the concept should be understood "as a clear point of departure for
developing a refined policy and practice of government liability in court to
private complainants."14 2 I do submit that federal sovereign immunity was
a natural and common-sense legal development and is justifiable in a re-
gime of popular sovereignty and a constitutional system with separation of
powers. But I simultaneously have insisted that sovereign immunity
should be only a starting point for developing a more sophisticated and
modulated network of statutes authorizing a large and appropriate mea-
sure of judicial redress against the government.
Although Congress initially proved to be a slow builder on the bare
concrete slab of sovereign immunity,143 a fairly comprehensive statutory
regime is now in place that establishes federal government liability for tor-
tious and contractual harms, balanced however by well-justified policy limi-
tations. Congress has enacted statutory waivers of sovereign immunity that
cover most substantive areas of law and apply to most situations in which a
plaintiff would seek relief, from claims that sound in tort under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act (FTCA)1 44 or the Suits in Admiralty Actl 45 to claims
for breach of contract and for compensation for takings of property or by
statute under the Contract Disputes Act' 46 and the Tucker Act,147 and
beyond to claims for employment discrimination by the federal employer
140. Id. at 60 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
141. Sisk, supra note 7, at 526.
142. Id.
143. As I have noted previously:
[D]uring more than two centuries of American history under our Consti-
tution, Congress has often proven to be an indolent builder of a regime
for governmental accountability in court, leaving the foundation bare for
decades and then slowly adding a wall at a time, with large breaks of time
in between, and only reaching a stage of rough completion in the last few
decades.
Id. at 530.
144. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (2006).
145. 46 U.S.C. §§ 30901-30918 (2006).
146. 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613 (2006).
147. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a) (2), 1491 (2006).
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under Title V1 4 8 and for environmental harms.1 4 9 In sum, as I have pre-
viously described it, congressional enactments "have woven a broad tapes-
try of authorized judicial actions against the federal government."1 5 0
After acknowledging the growth of statutory waivers of federal sover-
eign immunity, Donald Doernberg nonetheless argues that, " [e]ven under
the current framework, however, the concept of sovereign immunity from
liability for conduct outside the law hovers menacingly in the back-
ground."' 5 1 Rather than being an unavoidable feature of sovereign im-
munity itself as a background doctrine, the "menace" that Doernberg
identifies may persist because of an overly broad application of a rule of
strict construction for statutory waivers.
In arguing for a more coherent theory for judicial construction of
statutory waivers of sovereign immunity, I have framed the question in this
way:
Even after the government has waived its sovereign immunity for
a particular category of claims, does the citizen who seeks judicial
redress for a governmental wrong still have a steep hill to climb,
with every word of text and every term of the statute being
slanted against the claimant? Should the courts regard suits
against the sovereign as "suspect, even when allowed," pursuant
to a parsimonious canon of strict construction? Do the rules of
construction for statutory waivers "load the dice for or against a
particular result," the upshot being that the government usually
wins? 15 2
Not unerringly or with consistent clarity, the Supreme Court appears
to be drifting toward an approach that reserves strict construction and
presumptions in favor of the government to core questions about whether
sovereign immunity has been expressly waived and the basic scope of that
waiver.' 5 3 As the Supreme Court put it in Lane v. Pena, "a waiver of the
Government's sovereign immunity will be strictly construed, in terms of its
scope, in favor of the sovereign." 154 Thus, both the theory of liability as-
serted in a claim against the United States (that is the cause of action),
148. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (2006).
149. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(a) (2), 1369(b) (2006);
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7604(a)(1)-(2), 7607(b) (2006).
150. Gregory C. Sisk, The Tapestry Unravels: Statutory Waivers of Sovereign Immu-
nity and Money Claims Against the United States, 71 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 602, 603
(2003).
151. DOERNBERG, supra note 23, at 83.
152. Sisk, supra note 7, at 521-22 (footnotes omitted) (citing Richard H. Fal-
lon, Jr., Claims Court at the Crossroads, 40 CATH. U. L. REv. 517, 517-18 (1991), and
ANTONIN ScALA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 27-28 (1997)).
153. See generally id. at 543-87.
154. 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (emphasis added); see also Dep't of Army v.
Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 261 (1999) (saying that "a waiver of sovereign immu-
nity is to be strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign").
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and the specific remedy requested (damages, injunction, etc.), must be
explicitly authorized under the statute.
For other terms, definitions, exceptions, and procedures in a statu-
tory waiver of federal sovereign immunity, however, ordinary rules of statu-
tory interpretation and construction should apply. In general, and
remembering that the statute is a waiver of sovereign immunity, the litiga-
tion should proceed in a manner consistent with private litigation. In
other words, "[a]n early jaundiced judicial attitude has resolved into a
greater respect for the legislative pledge of relief to those harmed by their
government."1 5 5 Or so I have dared to hope.
And I find encouragement on this score in a recent Supreme Court
decision involving the same statutory waiver, the FTCA, which was dis-
cussed earlier.'5 6 The particular provision of the FTCA that came before
the Supreme Court in Dolan v. United States Postal Service'57 was the excep-
tion for "[a]ny claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent
transmission of letters or postal matter."15 8 The factual scenario underly-
ing the case was this: Rather than putting it in the mail box, a postal car-
rier negligently dropped a bundle of letters, packages, and periodicals on
Barbara Dolan's front porch, causing her to trip and fall with serious inju-
ries. The question presented was whether, when mail left by the Postal
Service causes a slip-and-fall, the exception for "negligent transmission" of
postal matter is triggered.
Now if the governing rule truly is that everyjot and tittle in a statutory
waiver of sovereign immunity must be construed strictly and narrowly in
favor of the government, then a win for the government should have been
foreordained. After all, "postal matter" plainly was the immediate cause of
the fall, and one could say that the placement of the bundle on her front
porch constituted "negligent transmission" of that "postal matter."
And that isjust how the court of appeals saw it. Invoking the rule that
waivers of sovereign immunity are to be construed strictly in favor of the
sovereign, the court of appeals held in Dolan that the FTCA exception for
"negligent transmission" of postal matters barred claims based on "una-
voidable mishaps incident to the ordinary accepted operations of deliver-
ing millions of packages and letters each year," which covered a slip-and-
fall over letters, packages, and periodicals left on the porch.1 59 Showing
that the rule of strict construction was the pivot for its ruling, the court of
appeals said that "[t]o the extent that 'negligent transmission' is ambigu-
ous at all, any ambiguities in the language of a purported waiver of sover-
eign immunity must be construed in favor of the government." 6 0
155. Sisk, supra note 7, at 521-22.
156. For a discussion of the FTCA, see supra Part II.C.3.
157. 546 U.S. 481 (2006).
158. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b) (2006).
159. Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 377 F.3d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir. 2004).
160. Id.
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Likewise, in the Supreme Court, Justice Thomas stated that "[t]he
well-established rationale for construing a waiver in favor of the sover-
eign's immunity . . . applies with equal force to the construction of an
exception to that waiver."16 1 Relying on what he regarded as the ordinary
meaning of "transmission," Justice Thomas "conclude [d] that the postal
exception exempts the Government from liability for any claim arising out
of the negligent delivery of the mail to a Postal Service patron, including
Dolan's slip-and-fall claim." 162
But, at the Supreme Court, Justice Thomas was alone in dissent. The
other participating members of the Court instead applied the exception
more narrowly as excluding claims based on a failure to timely deliver mail
or on damage to its contents.1 63
The Dolan Court majority acknowledged that, "[i]f considered in iso-
lation, the phrase 'negligent transmission' could embrace a wide range of
negligent acts committed by the Postal Service in the course of delivering
mail, including creation of slip-and-fall hazards from leaving packets and
parcels on the porch of a residence."1 64 However, reading the phrase in
full context and considering the purpose of the provision, the Court rec-
ognized the words "negligent transmission," "loss," and "miscarriage" as
referring to "failings in the postal obligation to deliver mail in a timely
manner to the right address."1 6 5 Moreover, given that a primary objective
of the FTCA was to waive sovereign immunity for claims arising out of
automobile accidents, and specifically the negligent operation of motor
vehicles by postal workers while delivering the mail,1 6 6 a broader reading
would immunize the United States from any harm resulting from any pos-
tal activities performed while mail was being transported. Based on text,
context, and legislative intent, the Court concluded that the exception ex-
cludes governmental liability "only for injuries arising, directly or conse-
quentially, because mail either fails to arrive at all or arrives late, in
damaged condition, or at the wrong address."1 6 7
With respect to principles of statutory interpretation, the Court ob-
served that the FTCA accomplished a waiver of sovereign immunity by
"confer[ring] federal-court jurisdiction in a defined category of cases in-
volving negligence committed by federal employees in the course of their
161. Dolan, 546 U.S. at 498 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 494.
163. See id. at 485-92 (majority opinion).
164. Id. at 486.
165. Id. at 486-87.
166. See id. 487-88.
167. Id. at 487-89. See, e.g., Sportique Fashions, Inc. v. Sullivan, 597 F.2d 664
(9th Cir. 1979) (holding that FTCA postal matter exception precluded claim
against postal service supervisors for business losses suffered when clothing store's
advertising mailers were not timely delivered).
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employment," and by directing that the United States is subject to liability
in the same manner as a private person under like circumstances.' 68
Accordingly, the Dolan Court "noted that this case does not implicate
the general rule that 'a waiver of the Government's sovereign immunity
will be strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sover-
eign.'" 16 o The Court explained "this principle is 'unhelpful' in the FTCA
context, where 'unduly generous interpretations of the exceptions run the
risk of defeating the central purpose of the statute,' which 'waives the Gov-
ernment's immunity from suit in sweeping language.'" 1 7 0 Having identi-
fied the "postal matter" provision as an exception to the general waiver of
immunity, the Court explained "the proper objective of a court attempting
to construe one of the subsections of 28 U.S.C. § 2680 is to identify 'those
circumstances which are within the words and reason of the exception'-
no less and no more."17 1
In sum, when the democratic polity has opened the courthouse doors
to claims against the government, the judiciary should not slam them shut
again in a misguided resurrection of sovereign immunity. As the Dolan
case illustrates, the rule of strict construction no longer overwhelms inter-
pretation of every element of a statute related to a waiver of sovereign
immunity. Just as the courts should withhold judgment when sovereign
immunity has not been waived, the courts should proceed appropriately
when it has been waived. As the Supreme Court had counseled in an ear-
lier decision, "once Congress has waived sovereign immunity over certain
subject matter, the Court should be careful not to 'assume the authority to
narrow the waiver that Congress intended."' 1 7 2
IV. CONCLUSION
At an academic conference a decade ago, Akhil Amar quipped that
"sovereign immunity means never having to say you're sorry."' 7 3 Those of
us who came of age during the 1960s and 1970s will recognize this allusion
to Erich Segal's 1970 novel Love Story, and the movie of the same name, in
which the character played on the screen by Ryan O'Neal declares that
"[1]ove means never having to say you're sorry."' 74
When that book and movie came out, my wise mother quickly classi-
fied this as another foolish aphorism arising during a sometimes irrespon-
168. Dolan, 546 U.S. at 484-85 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b) (1), 2674).
169. Id. at 491 (quoting Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996)).
170. Id. at 491-92 (quoting Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 853 n.9
(1984), and United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 547 (1951)).
171. Id. at 492 (quoting Kosak, 465 U.S. at 853 n.9).
172. Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 137 (1991).
173. Karen Cordry, Of State Sovereign Immunity and Prospective Remedies: The
Bankruptcy Discharge as Statutory Ex Parte Young Relief A Response, 77 Am. BANKR.
L.J. 23, 23 & n.2 (2003) (quoting Akhil Amar).
174. ERICH SEGAL, LoVE STORY 91 (1970).
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sible and superficial era. Instead, she admonished us, "love means having
to say you're sorry-again and again and again."
The same is true of a nation. When we as a people do wrong to a
segment of our community, or when a serious and inequitable injury is
visited upon an individual or group of people as an unavoidable collateral
effect of an otherwise justifiable policy, we have a public duty to apologize
and to make it right. Because politics is an imperfect human endeavor,
the occasions for apology and redress are likely to be many.
By advancing the inevitability of sovereign immunity as a background
doctrine of law that restrains the judiciary, I should not be mistaken as
expressing indifference or moral apathy. In fact, "the moral dimension of
apology is easily lost when it is injected into the legal arena."' 75 When
injustice has occurred, we should not hide behind legalities and doctrines
of restraint and the elements of causes of action. The responsibility to
hold our government to account lies with all of us, not only or even prima-
rily the courts. The consequences of public policy, for good and ill, are
realized in community and must be addressed by that community.
175. Cf Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE
L.J. 1135, 1147 (2000) (arguing that instrumental use of apology as remedial form
in civil mediation of disputes undermines "moral dimension of apology").
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